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What computational principles underlie human
pragmatic reasoning? A prominent approach to
pragmatics is the Rational Speech Act (RSA)
framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Frank, 2016), which formulates pragmatic reasoning as probabilistic speakers and listeners recursively reasoning about each other with
the goal of cooperatively gaining communicative
utility. While RSA enjoys broad empirical support, much remains unknown about the dynamics
of RSA recursion and whether it can be characterized by a general optimization principle. It has
been conjectured that RSA dynamics is guaranteed to increase expected utility (e.g., Yuan et al.,
2018; Peloquin et al., 2019), but these explorations
have relied on numeric simulations, leaving open
key questions about the dynamics of RSA models.
In this work we present a set of analytic results, demonstrated by model simulations, that extend the mathematical understanding of the RSA
framework and ground it in Rate–Distortion (RD)
theory (Shannon, 1948). First, we show that RSA
recursion optimizes a tradeoff between expected
utility and communicative effort, disconfirming
the conjecture that expected utility is guaranteed
to improve with recursion depth. Second, we show
that RSA can be grounded in RD theory, while
maintaining a similar ability to account for human
behavior and avoiding a bias of RSA toward random utterance production. Taken together, these
results suggest that human pragmatic reasoning
may be understood in terms of RD theory.
RSA as Alternating–Maximization. In RSA,
the speaker is defined by a production distribution
S(u|m) over possible utterances u given meaning m, and the listener is defined by an inference
distribution L(m|u). RSA recursively relates the
speaker and listener (see Figure 1) by assuming
a Bayesian listener—L(m|u) ∝ S(u|m)P (m),

with P (m) a prior distribution on speaker meanings that is assumed to be in common ground—
and a speaker that is bounded-rational with respect to a utility function V (u, m), typically defined as V (m, u) = log L(m|u) − C(u) where
C(u) specifies the cost of u. That is, S(u|m) ∝
exp(αV (u, m)), where α controls the degree to
which the speaker maximizes utility.
Our first theoretical result is that RSA’s recursive reasoning implements an alternating maximization (AM) algorithm (Csiszár and Shields,
2004). However, this optimization does not maximize expected utility as previously conjectured,
but rather a tradeoff between maximizing expected
utility, ES [VL ], and minimizing communicative
effort measured by the conditional entropy of
the speaker’s production distribution, HS (U |M ),
such that low effort corresponds to high entropy.
Formally, we prove that for any α ≥ 0, each update step in RSA maximizes
Gα [S, L] = HS (U |M ) + αES [VL ] .

(1)

This analytic result is demonstrated numerically
in Figure 1. Note that this does not imply that

L0
S1
L1
S2
L2
S3
...

Figure 1: Model simulations demonstrate that the
RSA recursion implements an alternating maximization algorithm. RSA’s tradeoff Gα improves with each
speaker (blue) and listener (orange) update. Inset: Illustration of the RSA recursion.
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the expected utility is necessarily maximized, and
our analysis finds counter-examples where the expected utility decreases with recursion depth while
the conditional entropy increases.
RD-RSA: Grounding RSA in Rate–Distortion.
In the communication setup of RSA, the speaker
can be seen as a probabilistic encoder and the
listener as a probabilistic decoder. From an
information-theoretic perspective, RD theory predicts that the speaker and listener should jointly
optimize the tradeoff between maximizing the expected utility and minimizing the number of bits
required for communication. The latter is captured by the mutual information between speaker
meanings and utterances, IS (M ; U ). Formally,
this tradeoff is given by
Fα [S, L] = IS (M ; U ) − αES [VL ] ,

(2)

which is closely related to Gα and can similarly
be optimized via an AM algorithm. The optimal
RD-RSA listener is Bayesian, as in RSA; however, the optimal speaker takes the form S(u|m) ∝
S(u) exp(αV (u, m)), differing from the RSA
speaker in weighting the soft-max utility term
by marginal utterance probability S(u) (note that
S(u) is not pre-determined but rather changes with
each iteration as the speaker reasons about the listener). We refer to this modified model of pragmatic reasoning as RD-RSA.
While RD-RSA and RSA are closely related,
their theoretical motivation and precise predictions

differ. This raises the question: which model
may better characterize human pragmatic reasoning? To begin to address this question, we study
the dynamics of RSA and RD-RSA and compare
their predictions against human behavior in pragmatic reference games (Vogel et al., 2014). Figure 2 shows simulated trajectories of pragmatic
reasoning from the two models, and reveals that
RD-RSA can account for human behavior as well
as RSA. At the same time, our theoretical analysis reveals that the RSA speaker has an inherent
bias toward non-informative utterance production,
while the RD-RSA speaker does not.
Conclusions. We have shown that with a small
adjustment, the RSA framework can be grounded
in Shannon’s RD theory, while maintaining a similar ability to account for human data and avoiding a bias toward random utterance production.
This work furthers the mathematical understanding of RSA models, and suggests that fundamental information-theoretic principles may give rise
to human pragmatic reasoning.
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Figure 2: Top: Simulated model trajectories in RSA
(left) and RD-RSA (right). Bottom: Pearson correlation between model predictions and human behavioral
results from Vogel et al. (2014).
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